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firm's capital expenditures. Creditors are more likely to impose a capital expenditure restriction as a
borrower's credit quality deteriorates, and the use of a restriction appears at least as sensitive to borrower
credit quality as other contractual terms, such as interest rates, collateral requirements, or the use of
financial covenants. We find that capital expenditure restrictions cause a reduction in firm investment and
that firms obtaining contracts with a new restriction experience subsequent increases in their market
value and operating performance.
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Abstract
We provide novel empirical evidence of a direct contracting channel through which firm financial policy
affects firm investment policy. We examine a large sample of private credit agreements between banks
and publicly traded U.S. corporations and find that 32% of the agreements contain an explicit restriction
on the firm’s capital expenditures. Creditors are more likely to impose a restriction following negative
borrower performance, and the effect of negative performance on the likelihood of facing a capital
expenditure restriction is larger than the effect of negative performance on other loan terms such as the
interest spread or pledging of collateral. We also demonstrate that the restrictions affect firm investment
policy. For example, we show that most of the actual capital expenditures of borrowers with restrictions
cluster just below their restricted amount, while in the year prior to the contract, the same borrowers’
capital expenditures are distributed evenly above and below the restriction. Our results are consistent
with control-based theories of financing in which creditors retain control rights over investment policy as
a second-best solution to agency conflicts.
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One of the most important topics in corporate finance concerns the relationship between firm
financial and investment policy. The majority of theoretical research on this topic argues that firm
investment is constrained indirectly by external financial frictions such as information asymmetry,
collateral constraints, or debt overhang. However, an alternative line of theoretical research posits a more
direct, contractual link. These “control-based” theories of financial contracting argue that, in the presence
of agency conflicts and contractual incompleteness, optimal contracts will give creditors direct control
rights over firm investment policy in certain states (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Aghion and Bolton
(1992), and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)).
To date, existing empirical research on the investment policy of public firms has found little
support for control-based theories of financial contracting, beyond cases in which the borrower has
defaulted on a payment obligation. For example, in their classic examination of bond covenants, Smith
and Warner (1979) state that “extensive direct restrictions on production/investment policy would be
expensive to employ and are not observed.” Similarly, Billett, King, and Mauer (2006) find that fewer
than 5% of public bond indentures contain an explicit restriction on firm investments. Moreover, past
studies that document an empirical relationship between financial and investment policy rely primarily on
external financial frictions to explain their results (see Hubbard (1998), Stein (2003), Hennessy (2004),
Hennessy and Whited (2006)).
In this paper, we provide novel empirical evidence on the micro-foundations of corporate
financing and investment policy and find broad support for the control-based theories. In particular, we
examine over 3,000 private credit agreements between banks and publicly-traded U.S. corporations and
document that roughly 30% of these contracts include explicit restrictions on the borrower’s capital
expenditures. Moreover, we demonstrate that these restrictions are more likely to be put in place
following poor firm performance, and that the restrictions impact actual firm investment policy. To our
knowledge, this is the first paper to document both the widespread use and the effects of direct contractual
restrictions on the investment policy of solvent public firms.
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The novelty of our findings is due, in part, to the contracts we examine: private credit agreements
represent an ideal – and largely overlooked – setting for examining the influence of financing on
investment policy. Roughly 80% of all public firms maintain private credit agreements, typically as bank
revolving credit facilities. By comparison, only 15 to 20% of public firms have public debt (Sufi (2006a),
Faulkender and Petersen (2006)). Moreover, private credit agreements contain covenant restrictions that
are more detailed, comprehensive, and tightly set than public bond indentures (see Dichev and Skinner
(2001), Sweeney (1994), Kahan and Tuckman (1995), Chava and Roberts (2006), and Sufi (2006a) for
empirical evidence and Park (2000) for a theoretical justification). In other words, private credit
agreements contain the covenants that are most likely to influence firm behavior. Given that 95% of
firms with public debt also have a private credit agreement in the form of a revolving credit facility (Sufi
(2006a)), an analysis of these contracts is essential to understanding the impact of covenants on firm
behavior.
We motivate our analysis of these contracts with the help of three control-based theories of
financing. Jensen and Meckling (1976) contend that explicit creditor control of firm investment policy is
part of second-best optimal debt contracts in the presence of managerial agency problems. Investment
restrictions can lower the cost of debt by mitigating the chance that a manager, acting in the interest of
shareholders, chooses riskier investments at the expense of creditors. Aghion and Bolton (1992) and
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) build on the intuition in Jensen and Meckling (1976) by examining the
allocation of control rights when contracts are incomplete (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore
(1990)). They show that the division of control rights over firm investment policy should be contingent
upon the outcome of a noisy performance signal that is correlated with either unobservable effort
(Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)) or states of nature indicating that managerial actions are most likely to
create a negative externality (Aghion and Bolton (1992)). Under standard parameterizations of the
models, low values of the performance signal cause control rights to shift to creditors to minimize
inefficient future investment decisions.
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We empirically investigate two implications of these models. First, we examine whether the
allocation of control rights over firm investment policy is an important part of observed contracts.
Second, we examine whether creditors exert more control over firm investment policy in response to
negative borrower performance.
Our first result documents that the allocation of control rights over firm investment policy is an
important part of observed contracts, even among borrowers that have not defaulted on interest payments.
More specifically, 32% of the private credit agreements in our panel contain an explicit restriction on the
firm’s capital expenditures, and 40% of the firms in our sample obtain at least one loan between 1996 and
2005 that contains a restriction. Moreover, capital expenditure restrictions are present in the contracts of
borrowers across all industries and size categories. These findings stand in stark contrast to studies of
bond indentures, and constitute prima facie evidence that the allocation of control rights over investment
policy is a common element of debt contracting.
Second, we find that creditors obtain more control over firm investment policy in response to
negative firm performance. More specifically, using firm fixed-effects regressions within a panel of loan
contracts, we find that a capital expenditure restriction is more likely to be imposed following a decline in
cash flow, a financial covenant violation, or a downgrade in the firm’s credit rating. The effect of
negative firm performance on the likelihood of having a capital expenditure restriction is both statistically
robust and economically meaningful. For example, a firm that is downgraded from the lowest
investment-grade S&P rating (BBB) to the highest speculative-grade rating (BB) experiences an 18
percentage point increase in the likelihood of facing a capital expenditure restriction, which translates to a
56% increase in the likelihood, evaluated at the mean.
We also show that control over investment policy is among the most important performancecontingent contractual features found in loan agreements. The elasticity of imposing a capital expenditure
restriction with respect to a negative performance shock is larger than the elasticities associated with the
interest spread, the pledging of collateral, and the restriction of dividend payments. For example, our
estimates imply that a financial covenant violation leads to a 14 percentage point increase in the
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likelihood that a capital expenditure restriction is put in place, which is a 44% percent change evaluated at
the mean. By contrast, the same loan experiences an estimated increase in the contracted interest spread
of 23 basis points, which is only a 14% increase evaluated at the mean.
In our third set of results, we document a direct contracting channel through which financing
affects investment policy by showing compelling evidence that capital expenditure restrictions constrain
firm investment. Using a sub-sample of 483 credit agreements from which we collect the actual value of
the capital expenditure restriction, we show that firm capital expenditures cluster tightly at or below the
contractual limit. Expenditures of nearly 30% of firms lie within one percentage point below the actual
restriction, measured relative to lagged assets, and more than 80% of the firms have expenditures
clustered within five percentage points below the restriction. In contrast, we only observe 10% of the
firms with expenditures within one percentage point above the restriction, and only 15% with
expenditures that lie within five percentage points above the restriction. Relative to an estimated smooth
parametric distribution, we can easily reject the hypothesis that observations do not cluster just below the
restriction; likewise, we are able to statistically reject the hypothesis that the number of observations
above the restriction is not too low.
The results are even more dramatic when we focus on the credit agreements in which a capital
expenditure restriction is imposed after being absent in the previous contract. Before the new credit
agreement is signed, almost 50% of observations are above the yet to be imposed restriction amount.
After the restriction is imposed, less than 10% are above the restriction amount and over 60% of the firms
lie in the expenditure area two percentage points below the restriction. Such a dramatic shift in
expenditures to the area just below the restriction amount is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that
the restrictions do not affect investment policy. We buttress these findings by showing in a broader
sample that firms obtaining a loan with a capital expenditure restriction exhibit a larger decline in their
capital expenditures than firms obtaining a loan without such a restriction, even after controlling for
changes in performance.
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We view our paper as making a novel contribution to the literature along three dimensions. Our
most important contribution is to provide evidence that creditors play a much more direct, contractual role
in the investment policy of public firms than has previously been recognized in the literature. While there
is a large body of empirical research that documents an indirect relationship between financing and
investment (Hubbard (1998), Hennessy (2004), and Hennessy and Whited (2006)), the existing literature
overlooks the more straightforward explanation that investment levels can be explicitly governed by
contract. In addition, our paper departs from the existing literature that emphasizes how financial
constraints can lead to inefficiently low investment. Instead, we find support for the optimal contracting
framework of control-based theories of financing, in which constraints on investment are a second-best
solution when management is likely to engage in potentially value-destroying investment.
In terms of how debt financing affects investment, the recent paper by Chava and Roberts (2006)
is most closely related to the segment of our empirical findings related to financial covenant violations.
Chava and Roberts (2006) use a regression discontinuity approach to show that violations of financial
covenants cause a reduction in capital expenditures. They focus more on identifying the effect rather than
documenting the channel through which the effect occurs and make no mention of the explicit restrictions
on capital expenditures that are at the heart of our analysis. We view their findings as complementary.
Indeed, our specific finding that creditors impose a capital expenditure restriction after a financial
covenant violation is a possible explanation for their findings. Moreover, our finding that capital
expenditures cluster just below the contractually restricted amount complements their regression
discontinuity approach. Using two different empirical approaches, both papers find that covenants affect
investment.
Our second contribution is to provide empirical support for the idea that shifts in control rights
occur in a manner that is consistent with Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994).
Two other papers have documented related findings. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) study 211 financial
contracts between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs and document that the division of control
rights between VCs and entrepreneurs is often contingent on observable performance signals, with control
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shifting to the VCs when signals are low (See also Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) and Kaplan, Martel, and
Strömberg (2006)). Lerner, Shane, and Tsai (2004) examine 200 contracts between small biotechnology
firms and major corporations that act as investors, and show that control rights shift to investors after
negative industry-wide shocks, and shift back to the firms after positive industry shocks. Our paper
complements these findings by demonstrating that debt-related control shifts are a common feature of
private credit agreements among a wide set of large, public firms.
Our third contribution relates to identifying the large role that creditors can have in controlling
day-to-day corporate decision-making. Our results fall in line with the more general thesis in Baird and
Rasmussen (2006) that creditors have substantial, though traditionally unrecognized, influence over the
governance of corporations. This paper provides large sample statistical corroboration of the mainly
anecdotal evidence in Baird and Rasmussen (2006).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the data and summary
statistics. Section II presents the theoretical framework with which we motivate the empirical analysis.
Sections III through V present the results, and Section VI concludes.
I. Data and Summary Statistics
Our investigation centers on the information we gather from the covenants of private credit
agreements between banks and public firms. As mentioned above, we focus on bank credit agreements
because, relative to other debt agreements, the covenants contained in bank loans are tighter, more likely
to be violated, and more relevant in terms of restrictions on the firm. Historically, information on bank
loans has been difficult to gather directly because of the customary secrecy between banks and borrowers.
As private agreements, the loans are not legal securities and are not subject to direct SEC regulation.
However, SEC precedent has established a requirement that public companies include copies of all
“material” contracts, including bank loan agreements, with relevant SEC disclosures. 1 The contracts
typically appear as exhibits at the end of a 10-K or 10-Q report, or as an attachment to an 8-K filing. The
1

The reporting requirements for loan contracts fall within item 601(b) of regulation S-K, which is the general
provision that requires exhibits to be filed. Item 4 and item 10 under this regulation require disclosure of securities
and the disclosure of all material contracts, respectively. Most loan contracts fall within one of these two categories.
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SEC’s Edgar electronic filing system now makes it possible to search, extract, and download these credit
agreements. We use these agreements to construct our sample of contracts with and without capital
expenditure restrictions.
To build our complete dataset, we begin with loan deals from Loan Pricing Corporations’s
Dealscan database that have already been linked to firms in Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. To
these deals, we match the credit agreements downloaded from Edgar. Our final data set includes 3,720
credit agreements to 1,931 public borrowers from 1996 through 2005. Below, we detail the datacollection process.
A. Data: Loan agreements from Edgar
We begin with a sample of loan deals from Dealscan that are matched with firm financial
characteristics from Compustat. A loan deal may contain more than one loan “tranche”. For instance, a
typical deal may include a revolving line of credit tranche and two term-loan tranches. As Sufi (2006b)
notes, the credit agreement governing each loan deal is drafted at the deal level. A deal-level analysis, as
opposed to a tranche-level analysis, is therefore more appropriate when analyzing credit agreements. Our
sample includes deals made to non-financial firms, and we require that each deal have information on the
amount of the deal and the interest spread of all tranches in the deal. The sample is restricted to deals
made from 1996 through 2005. We impose the latter restriction to merge Dealscan observations to their
electronic contracts contained in Edgar. The SEC began requiring firms to file electronically only in
1996; electronic filings are only sparsely available before that date. Once these restrictions are in place,
we are left with 9,580 deals (representing 13,715 loan tranches).
From Compustat, we construct financial statistics as the average of the four quarters prior to the
loan agreement being signed. Cash flow is constructed using item 21, scaled by the book value of total
assets (item 44). The book leverage ratio is long term debt (item 51) plus short term debt (item 45), scaled
by book assets. The market to book ratio is total assets less the book value of equity plus the market
value of equity, all scaled by total assets. The book value of equity is the book value of assets less the
book value of liabilities (item 54) and preferred stock (annual item 10) plus deferred taxes (item 52). The
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market value of equity is common shares outstanding (item 14) multiplied by the share price (item 61).
We include only deals in which the borrower’s lagged cash flow, lagged market to book, and the lagged
leverage ratio are non-missing.
Dealscan contains no information on capital expenditure restrictions. To obtain this information,
we use text-search programs to scan every 10-Q, 10-K, and 8-K filing in Edgar for loan contracts. More
specifically, we match every firm in Compustat to its respective set of SEC filings, and then scan these
filings for key search terms that allow us to extract loan agreements. Given SEC reporting requirements,
the loan contracts examined in this paper are those deemed to be “material” by the borrowing company.
We extract the actual bank credit agreements from SEC filings by “tagging” each filing to see if it
contains an agreement. Our specific tag is whether a line of the filing contains one of the following 10
terms in capital letters: “CREDIT AGREEMENT,” “LOAN AGREEMENT,” “CREDIT FACILITY,”
“LOAN AND SECURITY AGREEMENT,” “LOAN & SECURITY AGREEMENT,” “REVOLVING
CREDIT,” “FINANCING AND SECURITY AGREEMENT,” “FINANCING & SECURITY
AGREEMENT,” “CREDIT AND GUARANTY AGREEMENT,” and “CREDIT & GUARANTY
AGREEMENT.” If we find one of these 10 terms, we also require the document to contain the search
term “TABLE OF CONTENTS” within 60 lines after the initial search terms. This process allows us to
extract most original credit agreements, and many of the major amendments and restatements of credit
agreements, that are contained in Edgar. We match the credit agreement to Dealscan based on the date of
the loan agreement and the company identifier.2
Of the 9,580 deals in Dealscan, we are able to successfully match almost 40% to the actual credit
agreement from Edgar to yield the final sample of 3,720 loan contracts for 1,931 borrowers. In order to
understand why the match rate is only 40%, it is instructive to describe how LPC constructs its Dealscan
data set. Dealscan obtains its most detailed observations from SEC filings. LPC follows the filing of
SEC documents and continually extracts information from those filings that contain credit agreements.
2

For less than 5% of deals in Dealscan, a borrower has more than one deal signed on the same date. We treat all
deals signed on the same date by the same firm as one deal, and we append all credit agreements collected from
EDGAR for the same firm and the same credit agreement date into one master credit agreement.
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But LPC also creates additional Dealscan observations through information collected from financial
institutions that report “deal flow” directly to LPC. The company uses this information to construct
league tables of bank loan deals. Although LPC requires that the financial institutions provide enough
information on the loans to verify the accuracy of the information, they do not typically obtain the level of
detail available from a copy of the credit agreement. Thus, the level of detail in a Dealscan record will
tend to depend on whether LPC could find the original credit agreement in an SEC filing.
[TABLE 1]
Table 1 examines the differences in Dealscan deals that are matched and unmatched to a loan
contract from Edgar. The table indicates that the Dealscan data quality of unmatched deals is much
poorer than matched deals. In particular, data describing collateral, whether a deal has a dividend
restriction, and the percentage held by each lender are more likely to be missing for deals that we are
unable to match to a contract. The results for collateral and the dividend restriction are particularly
striking; these data are missing in Dealscan for 44% and 52% of the deals that we are unable to match,
respectively, whereas these data are unavailable for only 16% and 7% of matched deals. In addition,
financial covenant data are missing for over 42% of unmatched deals, but only 7% of matched deals.3
Thus, our data set appears to overlap heavily with the set of deals in Dealscan for which the LPC is able
to obtain the full contract.
Deals that we are unable to match to a contract are also more likely to be sole-lender deals (as
opposed to syndicated deals) and revolving credit agreements with maturity of less than 1 year. This
latter result may be due to the fact that short term revolving credit facilities are less likely to be
considered material contracts, and are less likely to be filed with the SEC.
In terms of any broader sample selection issues, the bottom of Table 1 shows that deals that we
are unable to match to a contract are to larger, less levered, and lower cash-flow firms. Only the size
3

We code financial covenant data as missing if the field “Covenants: Financial Covenants” is listed as “No.”
Representatives from Dealscan maintain that virtually every loan has at least some form of a financial covenant, and
that the financial covenant field being set to “No” more accurately reflects the data being unavailable rather than the
loan not having a financial covenant. The evidence in Table 1 that almost 95% of matched contracts contain a
financial covenant is consistent with this interpretation.
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difference is statistically distinct from 0 at the 1 percent level. Moreover, there is no statistically
significant difference between the average loan amount or interest spread for matched and unmatched
loans. Overall, we do not believe we introduce any significant bias by focusing only on deals that we
have matched to contracts.
We also collect data on whether firms violate a financial covenant in the year prior to the loan
agreement. Financial covenants are accounting-based risk and performance hurdles that the borrower
must meet to be in compliance with the credit agreement. Typical financial covenants include leverage
ratios (measures of debt-to-assets or debt-to-cash flow), interest coverage and “fixed charge” ratios
(measures of cash-to-interest-type expenses), and measures of net worth (assets – liabilities). The breach
of a financial covenant means that the borrower is in technical default on the loan, and that the lender has
the right to demand immediate repayment of the entire loan. Such a demand can easily trigger a
bankruptcy filing because the borrower’s other creditors will also typically have the right to demand
“acceleration” of payments conditional on the bank debt default. Of course, the bank is not required to
accelerate the loan, and can opt to waive the covenant – that is, grant the borrower temporary relief from
the covenant -- or renegotiate the contract altogether. Thus, financial covenants serve as “tripwires” to
renegotiation that put substantial bargaining power in the hands of the banks.4
The SEC requires “companies that are, or are reasonably likely to be, in breach of [financial]
covenants [to] disclose material information about that breach and analyze the impact on the company if
material (SEC (2003)).” We exploit this requirement by searching all company 10-Ks in years
immediately preceding a loan agreement to determine whether a company is in violation of a financial
covenant. We use text-search algorithms to identify violations using the procedure described in Sufi
(2006a).
B. Capital Expenditure Restrictions
4

See Chava and Roberts (2006) and Sufi (2006a) for more information on financial covenants. Forced renegotiation
following financial covenant violations is broadly consistent with hypotheses developed in the incomplete contracts
literature. For example, Hart and Moore (1988) hypothesize that “parties can make up for … incompleteness … by
building into the contract the mechanism for revising the terms of trade as they each receive information about
benefits and costs.”
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Using the loan contracts that we match to Dealscan deals, we collect information on capital
expenditure restrictions contained in the agreement. There are a number of interesting control-oriented
covenants in private credit agreements, including restrictions on acquisitions, expenditures on non-capital
items, and changes in company ownership (Baird and Rasmussen, 2006). However, we restrict our
analysis to capital expenditure restrictions for three reasons. First, covenants restricting capital
expenditures are relatively straightforward to identify using our search methodologies. Second, a limit on
capital expenditures corresponds nicely with how control rights are modeled in the control-based theories
of financial contracting, particularly in Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), where creditors retain the right to
stop an investment from going forward. Third, the main component of a capital expenditure restriction is
“cash” capital expenditures, (Item 128 in Compustat), the measure most often used in papers on corporate
investment policy.5 Thus, the capital expenditure restriction pertains specifically to what is usually
termed “investment” in the corporate finance literature.
Capital expenditure restrictions are usually documented in the section on negative covenants near
the end of the credit agreement, and are commonly set as a nominal dollar amount for a given fiscal year.
The capital expenditure restriction contained in the June 29th, 2001 loan agreement for Airborne Express,
Inc is a typical example:
Limitation on Capital Expenditures. Capital Expenditures for each Fiscal Year shall not exceed
the maximum levels as set forth below opposite such Fiscal Year:
Fiscal Year Ended:
Maximum Level
December 31, 2001
$205,000,000
December 31, 2002
$255,000,000
December 31, 2003
$305,000,000

Alternatively, capital expenditure restrictions are sometimes enforced as percentages of performance
variables. For example, the loan agreement between American Precision Industries, Inc. and Marine
Midland Bank, dated August 31st, 1998 contains the following restriction:
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES. For any one fiscal year, [the borrower shall not] make or incur
aggregate Capital Expenditures in excess of seven and one-half percent (7-1/2%) of the
5

Capital expenditure restrictions typically cover cash capital expenditures as reported in a company’s Statement of
Cash Flows plus the capitalized value of new capital leases.
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Company's Consolidated net sales as shown on the Company's audited financial statements for
such fiscal year.
It is important to understand that these restrictions are not “boilerplate” covenants; instead, they are
tailored specifically to borrowers, and can be very detailed. We provide examples of some of the more
detailed restrictions in Section V.
For our full sample of loans, we collect information on whether a loan contract contains a capital
expenditure restriction by coding as a restriction any limit on the capital expenditure activities of the firm
or any of its subsidiaries. To find such restrictions, we use a text searching algorithm that scans all
contracts for the term “capital expenditure.” The search program tells us if the term is in the agreement,
which we then further examine to confirm whether the agreement has a capital expenditure restriction.
For firms that have a capital expenditure restriction, a fiscal year ending in December, and a
specific dollar restriction on aggregate capital expenditures defined over the fiscal year, we also collect
the actual capital expenditure restriction amount for the first year reported in the loan agreement. We
isolate this subset of firms in order to accurately measure the timing and amount of the restriction.6 This
subset includes 483 deals.
C. Summary statistics
[TABLE 2]
Table 2 contains the summary statistics for the sample of 3,720 private credit agreements signed
by 1,931 borrowers. The first statistic is also one of our main results: 32% of the agreements contain an
explicit restriction on capital expenditures. Across agreements with a capital expenditure restriction for
which we gather the restricted amount, the average level of the restriction measured relative to lagged
assets is 9.0%. The average capital expenditures in the year of the agreement for these firms, also
measured relative to lagged assets, is 6.4%. The average loan deal amount is $450 million, which

6

Actual restrictions often have rollover provisions that permit some portion of unused annual limits to be carried
over to the following fiscal year. To avoid the effect of accumulating limits, we focus on the first year. We use only
firms with fiscal year end in December for two reasons. First, the restrictions are sometimes given in terms of
calendar years, which would make calculation difficult for firms with alternative fiscal year ends. Second, if a firm
has a non-December fiscal year end, it is difficult to ascertain to which fiscal year the restriction applies.
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represents 34% of book assets. While this may appear large, it is important to understand that over 94%
of the deals contain revolving credit facilities, 2/3 of which typically remain unused (Sufi (2006a)). In
terms of the borrower’s performance in the year before the loan agreement is signed, cash flow averages
3.4% of total book assets, and 6% of firms have violated a financial covenant within the past year.
Almost 50% of deals in the sample are made to rated firms, which confirms the fact that most firms with
access to public debt markets also utilize bank loans. Conditional on having a credit rating, 2% of firms
in our sample have a rating of CCC or below. In other words, very few of the borrowers in our sample
are in, or very near bankruptcy.
II. Theoretical Framework
The results in Table 2 suggest that investment restrictions are a common component in the private
credit agreements of publicly traded corporations. The restrictions imply that, as part of the agreement
with borrowing firms, creditors often assign themselves explicit control rights over firm investment
policy. In this section, we motivate our empirical analysis by examining why creditors should care about
control rights, and why price and quantity mechanisms might, by themselves, be insufficient in optimal
financial contracts.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide the basis for control-based theories of financial contracting
by considering optimal mechanisms for mitigating agency costs of debt. They argue that explicit
covenants against risk-increasing investments can lower financing costs as long as the cost of abiding by
the restriction does not exceed the savings from lower interest payments. Aghion and Bolton (1992) and
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) extend this intuition, drawing on the idea that incomplete financial
contracts require some rule for allocating control rights across events that are not covered in the contract.
They demonstrate that optimal contracts within this framework may shift control rights from one party to
another, conditional on the outcome of some observable signal.
In Aghion and Bolton (1992), a wealth-constrained owner-manager seeks capital to finance
company projects that produce both cash profits and managerial private benefits. In their model,
contracts are written so that control rights optimally shift from the manager to the investor when private
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benefits are most likely to distort the manager into inefficient decisions.7 The result relies on a verifiable
signal that is correlated with the externality created by the manager’s private benefits. Even though
control by investors may itself be inefficient, there are states when investor control is more efficient than
continued manager control. Their most prominent example is when one of the potential states involves
low monetary benefits and high managerial private benefits. In this situation, managers have excess
continuation bias. If a noisy contractible signal implies that it is more likely that such a state has been
realized, creditors will optimally take control of firm investment policy.
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) offer a theory in which shifts in control rights serve as a deterrent
to discourage ex ante managerial misbehavior. Again assuming a manager with private benefits of
control, the threat of losing control serves as a disciplining device, and the optimal contract shifts control
away from managers when there is evidence of an inefficient effort choice. In order to encourage
investors to implement the optimal change of control, control rights are correlated with cash flow rights.
In fact, the optimal capital structure includes debt-like financing, where concave cash-flow rights
encourage debt-holders to acquire control rights after signs of poor performance. Thus:
Proper managerial incentives require outsiders to go against the managers’ will only when it is
likely that they have engaged in suboptimal courses of action. Poor performance is thus followed
by a high probability of external interference [by creditors], while good performance is rewarded
by a low probability of external interference (p. 1049, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994))
The model by Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) is related to our empirical analysis because “external
interference” involves giving the creditor the right to decide whether or not an investment should proceed
(See their Table I and description of the action space on page 1031).
A general point concerning these three models is that control shifts are triggered by the
realization of a verifiable signal, which may or may not be restricted to simple payment defaults. In fact,
the framework of Jensen and Meckling (1976) implies that creditors should exert control well before
bankruptcy in order to mitigate managerial risk shifting. Likewise, in Aghion and Bolton (1992),
managers receive monetary returns even after creditors obtain control rights, making their model more
7

Wealth constraints are the common friction used to prevent the Coase theorem from applying in control-based
theories of debt. Such a constraint is natural in a model of external finance.
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applicable to debt covenant violations for solvent firms rather than liquidations following bankruptcy (see
the discussion in their conclusion).
[TABLE 3]
Table 3 summarizes the main aspects of these three models, and how they apply to our empirical
setting. As the table suggests, the agency problems used in the three models to motivate creditor control
are distinct. Despite using different assumptions, these three models have two common hypotheses that
we use to motivate our empirical analysis. First, the allocation of control rights between management and
creditors should be an important part of observed financial contracts. Second, negative performance by
the borrower should increase the likelihood that control rights shift to creditors. We use our sample of
private credit agreements between public firms and banks to empirically examine these two hypotheses.
A further question regarding the second hypothesis is whether the models predict that contracts
themselves must be literally performance-contingent to resolve the underlying agency problem, or
whether it is sufficient for borrowers to understand that if they perform poorly, they must relinquish
control when they sign future or renegotiated contracts. Part of the reason for the ambiguity is that the
control-based theories abstract from maturity considerations; shorter maturity can be used by creditors to
effectively make future contract terms contingent on observed future performance, even if the original
contract terms are not explicitly performance-contingent. As the fifth line of Table 3 suggests, we believe
that a literally performance-contingent contract is necessary only to resolve the ex ante managerial moral
hazard problem in Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). In their framework, if creditors wait until after the
negative performance is realized to threaten investment restrictions in a future contract, then the ability to
renegotiate may mitigate the ex ante incentive effects of the punishment mechanism. One of our goals is
to shed light on whether private credit agreements contain the type of contingent-control language that is
hypothesized in Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), or whether creditors use alternative instruments to
effectively make future contract terms contingent on future borrower performance.
III. The Widespread Use of Capital Expenditure Restrictions
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The most direct implication of control-based theories of financial contracting is that the allocation
of control rights over firm investment policy should be an important feature of observed financial
contracts. In this section, we find support for this hypothesis by documenting the widespread use of
capital expenditure restrictions in private credit agreements.
[TABLE 4]
Table 4 documents that 32% of the credit agreements in our sample contain an explicit restriction
on capital expenditures. At the borrower level, this proportion translates to over 42% of the sample firms
having a capital expenditure restriction at some point between 1996 and 2005. Over roughly the same
period, Sufi (2006a) shows that over 80% of public firms in the Compustat universe utilize private credit
agreements in the form of bank lines of credit. These two statistics imply that (0.42*0.80 =) 34% of
Compustat firms are likely to face a capital expenditure restriction in a debt contract. Capital expenditure
restrictions are common across industries, outside of agriculture. In particular, about 40% of credit
agreements obtained by borrowers operating in the retail trade, wholesale trade, and services industries
contain a restriction, while roughly one-third of credit agreements to manufacturing borrowers have the
restriction. Across size cateogires, restrictions are more common for small firms, but a substantial
fraction of firms with over $1 billion in book assets also have agreements containing capital expenditure
restrictions.
Conditional on having an S&P corporate credit rating, only 6% of agreements obtained by
investment grade borrowers have a capital expenditure restriction. Among junk borrowers, the fraction of
agreements with a restriction is 44%. The large difference in the incidence of capital expenditure
restrictions among loans to junk and investment grade borrowers is evidence that negative borrower
performance shifts control of investment policy to creditors, something we explore further in Section IV.
Although capital expenditure restrictions are more common on loans to borrowers of lower credit
quality, Table 4 shows that capital expenditure restrictions are not exclusively associated with bankrupt
firms. For example, 39% of credit agreements obtained by firms with a BB rating have a capital
expenditure restriction, and on average, less than 1 in 100 of these borrowers default over a one year
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horizon, according to Moody’s historical default probability tables. Capital expenditure restrictions are
correlated with borrower performance, but they are not a restriction used exclusively on loans to
borrowers that are in or near bankruptcy.
IV. Capital Expenditure Restrictions and Borrower Performance
A. Empirical methodology
In Section III, we document that investment restrictions are an important part of private credit
agreements. In this section, we examine the second main implication of control-based theories of
financial contract: namely, that the imposition of capital expenditure restrictions by creditors is more
likely after negative borrower performance. We use three proxies for performance in order to empirically
evaluate this hypothesis. First, we use the borrower’s average cash flow scaled by assets in the four
quarters prior to the loan origination. Second, we use whether the firm has experienced a financial
covenant violation in the previous four quarters. As we discuss below, financial covenant violations are
an especially close empirical analog to the performance measures in control-based theories of financial
contracting. Finally, we use the borrower’s S&P corporate credit rating as a measure of performance.
The drawback of the credit rating measure is that it is only available for rated firms, which comprise only
49% of our sample.
Given that control-based theories of financial contracting focus on how within-firm changes in
performance affect the allocation of control rights, our empirical strategy seeks to estimate how withinfirm changes in these three performance measures affect the imposition of a capital expenditure
restriction. Our preferred specification is a borrower fixed effects linear probability model, in which the
borrower-specific, time-invariant error component is explicitly estimated. More formally, we estimate:

Pr(capexrestrictionit

1) D i  D t  E * Perfi ,t 1  *X i ,t 1  H it

(1)

Each observation represents a private credit agreement obtained by firm i in year t. The independent
variables are measured as the average values of the 4 quarters prior to the loan origination. The
coefficient of interest is E, which represents the linear estimate of the effect of within-firm changes in
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performance on the probability of having a capital expenditure restriction in the loan agreement. The
matrix X includes the following control variables: the market to book ratio, the leverage ratio, the natural
logarithm of total assets, indicator variables for the type of loan tranches in the agreement {all lines, all
term, or mix}, and indicator variables for the purpose of the loan {acquisitions, commercial paper backup facility, refinancing, or general corporate purposes}. Reported standard errors are clustered by firm.
The disadvantage of using borrower fixed effects to estimate (1) is that we are forced to limit the sample
to borrowers that have more than 1 credit agreement in our sample. There are 978 borrowers with only 1
credit agreement in our full sample. We also estimate (1) using pooled regressions to obtain partial
correlations for the full sample, but we rely on the fixed effects estimates when discussing magnitudes.
We acknowledge that there are well-documented drawbacks to using linear probability
estimation. While non-linear maximum likelihood estimation such as a logit or probit specification is
often preferable to linear probability models in cross-sectional analyses, we prefer the linear probability
specification in a panel data setting. As is well known, probit estimation suffers the incidental parameters
problem if one attempts to explicitly estimate the firm-specific time invariant error component (Bester
and Hansen (2006)). While a conditional logit estimator allows for estimates of coefficients using a
conditional density for each firm, it is difficult to assess the average partial effect of a covariate across the
entire sample. Given the drawbacks of non-linear maximum likelihood techniques in a panel setting, we
believe fixed effects linear probability estimation is the best methodology for obtaining average partial
effects while exploiting within-firm changes in covariates. Recent work by Fernandez-Val (2005)
suggests that any bias associated with fixed effects linear probability estimation may be minimal. In any
case, our results are qualitatively similar when using a conditional logit model.
B. Results
[TABLE 5]
Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates. The fixed effects estimate in column 1 shows that a
drop in cash flow leads to an increase in the probability of having a capital expenditure restriction in the
agreement. The magnitude suggests that a drop from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile of the cash
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flow distribution leads to a (0.025*2.3 =) 6 percentage point increase in the probability of having a capital
expenditure restriction, which is a (0.06/0.32 =) 19% increase, measured at the mean. The coefficient
estimate is statistically distinct from zero at the 1% level. The coefficient estimate in column 2 implies
that a financial covenant violation in the year preceding the loan origination leads to a 14 percentage point
increase in the probability of having a restriction on capital expenditures in the loan agreement, which is a
(0.14/0.32 =) 44% increase at the mean. Column 3 reports estimates from regressions performed on the
sample of rated borrowers, and the estimates imply a strong effect of credit downgrades on the probability
of having a capital expenditure restriction. For example, a firm that is downgraded from A or above to
BB experiences a 23 percentage point increase in the probability of having a capital expenditure
restriction, which is a (0.23/0.32 =) 72% increase at the mean.
Columns (4) through (6) report estimated coefficients from pooled regressions that allow us to
utilize the entire sample, as opposed to only firms with 2 or more credit agreements. The results are
similar: firms that perform poorly are more likely to have a capital expenditure restriction in their new
credit agreement. The estimate of the linear effect of a financial covenant violation is almost identical,
whereas the estimates on cash flow and ratings are slightly smaller.
Overall, the results in Table 5 provide support for one of the primary implications from controlbased theories of financial contracting. In response to poor firm performance, creditors are more likely to
place explicit restrictions on firm investment policy. As we further explore in Section V, this result
suggests that the well-documented positive correlation between firm performance and investment may be
explained in part by the fact that poorly performing borrowers are more likely to have investment
restrictions in their private credit agreements.
C. The relative importance of capital expenditure restrictions
Table 5 suggests that the incidence of a capital expenditure restriction is highly responsive to
negative firm performance. In this section, we explore how other contract terms respond to negative
performance in order to understand the relative importance of shifts in control over investment. We focus
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specifically on capital expenditure restrictions versus interest spreads, whether a loan is secured, and
whether a loan contains a dividend restriction.8
[TABLE 6]
Table 6 reports the unconditional correlations of the four contract terms we examine, and
documents that the terms are all positively correlated. In particular, a capital expenditure restriction is
most highly correlated with the interest spread and whether the loan is collateralized. The interest spread
is more highly correlated with whether the loan is secured than whether the loan has a capital expenditure
restriction. Interestingly, dividend restrictions are least correlated with capital expenditure restrictions.
Dividend restrictions are also relatively ubiquitous, appearing in 80% of the contracts in our sample.
Taken together, these statistics indicate that creditor control rights over dividend policy, while important,
likely restrict direct wealth transfers to shareholders rather than influence firm investment decisions.
[TABLE 7]
In Table 7, we report estimated coefficients from fixed effects regression specifications similar to
(1), except we separately replace the capital expenditure restriction dependent variable with the natural
logarithm of the interest spread (in basis points), an indicator of whether or not the loan is secured, and an
indicator of whether or not the loan contains a dividend restriction. The estimated coefficients in columns
1 and 2 show that negative firm performance results in higher interest spreads, although the effect of a
financial covenant violation is not statistically distinct from zero at a reasonable confidence level.
Likewise, columns 3 and 4 show that negative performance results in a higher probability of a loan being
secured, although again the effect of a financial covenant violation is not statistically distinct from zero at
a reasonable confidence level. The effect of negative performance has a weaker effect on the probability
of a dividend restriction, both in terms of the magnitude and statistical significance of the estimates. The
latter result is consistent with the argument that blatant wealth transfers are always a threat to creditors,
regardless of how the firm is performing.
8

In unreported results, we also examine how negative performance affects maturity and the dollar loan amounts.
We find weak evidence that loan amounts are positively correlated with cash flow, but generally find that
performance has no effect on loan maturity or amount.
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A main goal of this subsection is to document the relative importance of negative firm
performance on various contract terms. It is not surprising that interest rates and the probability of a loan
being secured both increase when the firm performs poorly. A standard risk-return framework generates
this prediction. What is more informative is the fact that the effect of negative performance on the
allocation of control rights is comparable or even larger than the effect of negative performance on
interest spreads or the pledging of collateral.
[FIGURE 1]
Figure 1 presents the evidence. It is constructed from the coefficient estimates in Tables 5 and 7,
and it shows how within-firm negative performance changes the contract term in question, where the
effect is stated as the percent change at the mean of the left hand side variable.9 The left panel examines
how a drop in the cash flow of a firm from the 90th to the 10th percentile of the distribution affects the
contract terms, whereas the right panel of Figure 1 examines how a financial covenant violation affects
contract terms. For example, a drop in a borrower’s cash flow from the 90th to the 10th percentile results
in a 38% increase in the likelihood of having a capital expenditure restriction at the mean. Figure 1
demonstrates that the effect of a large drop in cash flow has a similar magnitude effect on the probability
of a capital expenditure restriction or the interest spread, but a weaker effect on the probability that a loan
is collateralized or contains a dividend restriction. Figure 1 also shows that the effect of the financial
covenant violation has a substantially larger effect on the probability that a loan contains a capital
expenditure restriction than the effect on other contract terms. In particular, a financial covenant violation
increases the incidence of having a capital expenditure restriction by almost 45% at the mean; the effect
on the interest spread is only 15% at the mean.
[FIGURE 2]
Figure 2 shows similar results using credit ratings. The omitted group is firms rated A or higher,
and the graphs show the marginal effect of rating downgrades on various contract terms, where the effects

9

There is one exception. Figures 1 and 2 reflect estimated coefficients from regressions using the interest spread in
basis points as the left hand side variable, as opposed to the natural logarithm of the interest spread.
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are stated as percent changes at the mean of the left hand side variable. The slope of the downgrade effect
is steeper for capital expenditure restrictions than for collateral or dividend restrictions. A downgrade
from A or above to BB leads to a 70% increase in the incidence of a capital expenditure restriction at the
mean; a similar downgrade leads to a 45% increase in the interest spread. The differences are particularly
sharp when firms are rated CCC or worse, which is consistent with the notion that control shifts to
creditors as firms approach bankruptcy.
D. Contingency
In this sub-section, we explore the degree to which creditor control over firm investment policy is
explicitly contingent on borrower performance in credit agreements, as is hypothesized by Dewatripont
and Tirole (1994).
Our first finding is that the vast majority of contracts do not specify an explicit contingency. That
is, we rarely find contract provisions that specify that a capital expenditure will be imposed if the
borrower’s performance deteriorates.10 When we do find such a contingency, it is actually the mirrorimage of that discussed in theory. That is, the capital expenditure is imposed at the outset of the contract,
but the contract promises to remove the restriction conditional upon good borrower performance. Thus,
while such contingencies appear feasible, lenders do not specify that control will shift conditional on bad
borrower performance. Instead, observed agreements tend to either restrict or not restrict capital
expenditures.
The lack of explicit contractual contingencies does not imply that contingent control shifts do not
occur. One contingency arises from the fact that observed debt contracts always specify an exact maturity
date. Given that outstanding debt must be repaid at a specified date, creditors can use the maturity of the
loan to revise contract terms in response to negative borrower performance.11 Indeed, the results in Table

10

This stands in contrast to VC contracts; Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) show that is common for these contracts to
specify explicit control-oriented contingencies that occur in reaction to bad performance.
11
Berglöf and von Thadden (1994) study the benefits from issuing short-term versus long-term debt in the presence
of incomplete contracts. However, they otherwise assume that creditors can only gain control from payment
defaults (see also Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991)). We are not aware of any theoretical research that explores
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5 demonstrate that capital expenditure restrictions are more likely to be imposed in response to negative
borrower performance. Given that all of our sample borrowers are public firms with at least four quarters
of history before the loan begins, many of our sample contracts represent refinancing of prior loans.
A contingency more in line with the spirit of Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) is creditors’ use of
financial covenants. As mentioned above, financial covenants are performance-based limits contained in
almost all private credit agreements. A borrower that violates a financial covenant is in “technical
default” of the credit agreement, and the agreements give the lender the right to accelerate the outstanding
loan in response to a technical default. Technical defaults typically lead to a renegotiation of the loan
agreement in which creditors use their acceleration right to extract amendment fees and to impose harsher
terms in the new renegotiated agreement. It is important to note that financial covenant violations are not
uncommon incidents: Chava and Roberts (2006) report that 30 to 40% of firms in their sample violate a
net worth or current ratio covenant. Sufi (2006a) reports that 1 in 3 firms with a bank line of credit
violate a financial covenant at some point between 1996 and 2003.
[TABLE 8]
Table 8 documents how creditors use financial covenants to make capital expenditure restrictions
contingent on borrower performance. We isolate the sample to “contingent-contract” pairs, where each
pair represents two credit agreements between the same borrower and the same lender, the borrower has
violated a financial covenant before the new credit agreement, and the origination date of the new credit
agreement is before the maturity date of the old credit agreement. The new credit agreement therefore
likely represents a renegotiated loan agreement following a technical default by the borrower. Column 1
of Table 8 reports the fraction of original and renegotiated agreements that contain capital expenditure
restrictions. Just over 37% of credit agreements obtained before the financial covenant violation contain a
capital expenditure restriction, whereas over 60% of the renegotiated agreements following the violation
contain a capital expenditure restriction. That is, the renegotiated agreement after the covenant violation

the trade-off between creditors’ use of explicit contingencies versus the use of maturity when contracts are
incomplete. Perhaps the closest model is Hart and Moore (1998).
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is almost twice as likely to contain a restriction on capital expenditures. Table 8 also shows that the
renegotiated loan agreement has an interest spread that is 30% higher than the original loan agreement.
Creditors are also more likely to impose collateral and dividend restrictions in the renegotiated
agreements, but the difference is not statistically distinct from 0 at a reasonable confidence level. This is
partly due to the fact that over 80% of agreements prior to the covenant violation are already secured and
contain a dividend restriction.
The evidence in Table 8 suggests that credit agreements are very much contingent on future
performance through the creditors’ use of financial covenants. In response to a financial covenant
violation, the creditors are more likely to impose an explicit restriction on capital expenditures. This
contingency is a close empirical analog to the contingent contracts envisioned in Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994).
V. The Effect of Restrictions on Firm Investment
We now turn to the question of whether capital expenditure restrictions actually matter for firm
investment policy. Before moving to the formal analysis of the relationship between investment and
capital expenditure restrictions, we emphasize two facts that suggest that the restrictions are relevant for
firm investment policy. First, the results in Section IV suggest that the introduction of capital expenditure
restrictions is not random—it is systematically correlated with negative firm performance. While controlbased theories of financial contracting provide a strong theoretical framework for explaining why binding
investment restrictions would be imposed on firms that exhibit negative performance, there is no
framework, to our knowledge, that would predict banks putting irrelevant capital expenditure restrictions
on firms in response to negative performance. Simply stated, theory strongly suggests that the restrictions
are imposed with the intent of actually limiting investment.
Second, we can infer the relevance of the restrictions by simply noting the level of detail
associated with the restrictions in the contracts. As an example, the April 19, 2002 credit agreement for
The Chalone Wine Group, Ltd. contains a capital expenditure restriction that specifically limits the
amount that Chalone could spend on the purchase of wine barrels during the 2002 fiscal year. Non wine-
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barrel capital expenditures were restricted separately. Similarly, the March 27, 1997 revolving loan
agreement for casino operator Hollywood Park, Inc. (now Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc.) contains the
following set of detailed restrictions:
Capital Expenditures. [Borrower shall not] Make, or become legally obligated to make,
any Capital Expenditure except:
(a) Maintenance Capital Expenditures not in excess of (i) $15,000,000 for the Fiscal Year
ending December 31, 1997, (ii) $15,000,000 for the Fiscal Year ending December 31,
1998 and (iii) $20,000,000 for any subsequent Fiscal Year;
(b) Capital Expenditures to the extent financed by Indebtedness permitted under Section
6.9(h);
(c) Capital Expenditures for the construction of approximately 200 additional hotel
rooms, a restaurant, an entertainment lounge, meeting rooms, retail space and parking
facilities at the Reno Property not in excess of $25,000,000;
(d) Capital Expenditures for the construction of buffet and restaurant facilities at the
New Orleans Property not in excess of $10,000,000;
(e) Capital Expenditures for the purchase of capital assets which, as of the Closing Date,
are leased by Borrower or any Restricted Subsidiary from other Persons pursuant to
operating leases not in excess of $8,000,000; and
(f) Capital Expenditures not otherwise permitted above which, when added to all other
Basket Expenditures theretofore made, do not exceed $40,000,000.
Imposing such meticulous restrictions requires time and expense; it is difficult to see why banks would
include such a covenant unless it provides a real constraint that also adds significant value to the
contracting parties. Such examples are common in credit agreements and suggest that creditors often play
an important role in the investment choices of their borrowers.
We now take a more formal look at whether capital expenditure restrictions influence investment
policy. Documenting a causal effect of a capital expenditure restriction on actual investments is a
difficult task for three reasons. First, observed contracts are the outcome of bilateral negotiations.
Borrowers have the choice of accepting or rejecting a contract with such restrictions in place, and may
choose to accept only those contracts in which restrictions are set at planned capital expenditure levels.
Under this interpretation, firms that choose freely to stay at or below their planned expenditures would be
difficult to distinguish from firms that are constrained to remain below their restricted amount. Second,
the restrictions can be waived or renegotiated at the discretion of the lender. Indeed, creditor control
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implies that the lender has the option to reject or accept a borrower request to invest in capital
expenditures beyond the restriction amount; the restrictions do not necessitate that the lender must reject
all requests. Thus, unobservable waivers and amendments to restrictions make it more difficult to
ascertain the “bite” in the restrictions. Third, because our results show that capital expenditure
restrictions are imposed on firms that exhibit negative performance, and it is well documented that
negative performance is correlated with reductions in capital expenditures, we would likely expect a
reduction in capital expenditures even in the absence of the restriction. More formally, identifying the
causal effect of the restriction involves isolating an exogenous source of variation in the introduction of a
capital expenditure restriction. The primary source of variation we identify in Section IV is firm
performance, which is clearly not exogenous to investment.
We use two sets of empirical techniques to overcome these identification problems. First, we
exploit the actual restriction amount, and show that borrowers tend to cluster just below the restriction
amount in the year after the loan origination. Second, we conduct difference-in-differences tests
comparing the changes in expenditures through time of firms obtaining contracts with and without capital
expenditures.
Our most compelling evidence comes from examining the distribution of actual capital
expenditures relative the amounts restricted by contract. As mentioned in Section I, we collect the exact
capital expenditure limit in the loan agreement for a sub-sample of 483 loans in our sample. We use these
data to compare the borrower’s actual capital expenditures (annual item 128 in Compustat) to the
contractual limit. Specifically, we compute the difference between actual capital expenditures and the
contractual limit, and scale the result by lagged total assets (lagged annual item 44 in Compustat). Values
below zero indicate actual expenditures were below the limit, and values above zero indicate that actual
expenditures exceeded the limit.12

12

There are several reasons why actual expenditures may be above the limit. First, as mentioned above, firms can
obtain waivers to most contractual provisions, including the capital expenditure restriction. Second, most contracts
contain rollover provisions that permit some portion of ‘unused’ expenditures to be spent the following year. While
we attempt to identify new contracts that apply to a specific fiscal year, we likely include outstanding contracts
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[FIGURE 3]
Figure 3 plots a histogram of this difference along with a continuous normal distribution with
identical mean and standard deviation (the smooth black line). The noticeable kink in the empirical
distribution around zero suggests that exceeding the limit is costly. Although roughly half of the firms
fall within 2% of assets below the limit, only 12% of firms are within 2% of assets above the limit. Even
if a value of zero corresponded to the modal planned expenditures among these borrowers, we would
expect that, without the restriction, deviations from this mode would lie equally above and below the
restriction. Using the normal distribution distribution, we can test the hypothesis that the spike in
observations just below zero is statistically significant. Specifically, under the null hypothesis that the
data are drawn from the estimated normal distribution, the number of observations in the bin (-1%, 0%] is
distributed as a binomial random variable with success probability given by the difference in the
estimated cumulative distribution function evaluated at 0% and at -1%. While 30% of the observations
are in this bin, the expected number under the null hypothesis is only 16%, and the probability of
observing so many observations in that bin is less than 0.1% under the null hypothesis.13 Similarly, the
probability of observing only 12% of the observations in the bin (0%, 2%] is 0.2%. Combined, as
compared with the estimated parametric distribution, we have statistical evidence that a significant
portion of firms seem to move their actual capital expenditures from above the limit to just below the
limit. We view this as evidence that exceeding the contractual limit is costly.
[FIGURE 4]
Rather than considering a parametric distribution as the counterfactual measure of the difference
between actual capital expenditures and the contractual limit, Figure 4 provides a comparison with capital
expenditures from the prior year to the loan contract. Here we limit the sample to the subset of 81 loans

where the firm has some rollover capacity. Finally, contractually defined capital expenditures may differ from the
accounting definition used in financial statements. For example, capitalized leases are often included in the
contractual limit but accounted for separately from other capital expenditures. While we try to exclude unique
definitions of capital expenditures, our measures undoubtedly contain some noise.
13
While we can find a slightly better fitting parametric distribution, the conclusions are qualitatively robust to most
standard two parameter distributions.
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where we can identify that the immediate prior sample loan did not contain a restriction, so actual capital
expenditures from the prior year are more likely unrestricted by a contractual limit. Two results are
relevant. First, in the year of the agreement in which the restriction applies, the clustering of observations
just below the limit is more pronounced for this sample than for the broader sample underlying Figure 3.
Here, over 60% of the observations are within 2% of assets just below the threshold, suggesting that the
limit is most binding immediately after it is first introduced. Second, actual expenditures in the prior year
appear to have little relation with the contractual limit imposed subsequently. Most striking is that 41%
of the firms actually exceeded the limit in the prior year, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that firms
are equally likely to be above or below the limit in the prior year. Conversely, in the year of the
agreement, only 7% exceed the limit, and we can strongly reject the hypothesis that current year
expenditures exceed the limit with 50% probability.
[TABLE 9]
Finally, in Table 9, we examine the broader sample and compare annual changes in capital
expenditures for firms with and without a capital expenditure limit using difference-in-differences
methods. Panel A in Table 9 shows unconditional means of capital expenditures divided by lagged assets
around the year in which the credit agreement is signed. We compare agreements that do not contain a
restriction, agreements with a restriction, and agreements with a restriction where the previous agreement
does not contain a restriction. The latter group is analogous to the sample covered in Figure 4 and
provides a rough indicator of a new restriction. In all three groups, capital expenditures decrease
monotonically over the four-year period, beginning two years prior to the agreement and ending one year
after, primarily reflecting the calendar time period covered in our sample. However, the groups with
contractual restrictions experience significantly larger declines. Comparing the year before with the year
after, expenditures fall by an extra 0.4% of lagged assets when the credit agreement contains a restriction
and by an extra 1.4% of lagged assets when the agreement introduces a new restriction. Both estimates
are statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level, and significantly different from each
other. The evidence is similar when comparing two-year averages before and after the contract.

28

The first two columns of Panel B replicate the above results in a regression framework. The
slight differences in the magnitude of the coefficients reflect the inclusion of calendar year dummy
variables. Columns 3 and 4 incorporate changes in firm cash-flow and Q into the first-difference
regression. Both performance measures are significantly related to capital expenditures and slightly
reduce the magnitude and statistical significance of the capital expenditure variables. This is consistent
with the results in Table 5 that the introduction of a capital expenditure restriction is highly correlated
with cash flow. Even after controlling for these measures of performance, the point estimates in column 3
imply that capital expenditures drop by 0.1% of lagged assets more when firms have a capital expenditure
restriction imposed in a loan agreement and by an additional 0.8% of lagged assets when the restriction is
first introduced. The latter estimate is statistically distinct from zero at the 10% confidence level.
In sum, we find compelling evidence that capital expenditure restrictions affect firm investment
policy. Our results suggest a direct contracting channel through which financing affects investment. To
our knowledge, this is the first study to document such a channel.
VI. Conclusion
This paper provides novel empirical evidence of a direct contracting channel through which firm
financial policy affects firm investment policy. We focus on private credit agreements between banks and
publicly-traded U.S. corporations, and we document that creditors regularly impose explicit restrictions
on capital expenditures. These restrictions are more likely to be put in place after negative borrower
performance, and the elasticity of a capital expenditure restriction with respect to borrower performance
is larger than the elasticities of other contract terms, such as the interest spread or a collateral requirement.
Taken together, these results fall closely in line with control-based theories of financing, which imply that
creditors retain control rights over investment policy as a second-best solution to agency conflicts (Jensen
and Meckling (1976), Aghion and Bolton (1992), and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)).
In addition, we provide compelling evidence that restrictions on capital expenditures contained in
private credit agreements constrain firm investment policy. This result suggests that there is a direct
contractual link between financing and investment which goes beyond indirect financing frictions such as
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collateral constraints or debt overhang. It also suggests that the common interpretation in the literature
that external financing constraints lead to inefficiently low investment may be incorrect. Instead, our
findings suggest that restrictions on investment may be a second-best solution that constrains otherwise
inefficient investment.
We motivate future research by recognizing the main limitation of our analysis: we do not take an
empirical stand on the ex post efficiency of investment outcomes in the presence of capital expenditure
restrictions. That is, we do not attempt to measure whether restrictions bring firms closer to the first-best
level of investment in which incentives are perfectly aligned. This is a fundamentally important question
since understanding the efficiency of investment outcomes in the presence of creditor restrictions on
capital expenditures would allow us to quantify the broader implications of our findings on aggregate
investment.
We believe that there are two methodologies for addressing the ex post efficiency of investment
in the presence of contractual restrictions. First, one can examine the degree to which borrowers are able
to credibly convey information on profitable investments in order to renegotiate capital expenditure
limits. That is, how well can information on the quality of investment be transmitted and how easily can
contract terms be renegotiated ex post? This type of analysis would require detailed information on the
process by which banks and borrowers amend credit agreement covenants.
Second, an analysis of how external equity-holders value credit agreements with and without
capital expenditure restrictions would shed some light on whether the effect of restrictions on overall firm
value is positive or negative. The theories of Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994) suggest that external equity-holders benefit from the limitation of managerial agency problems,
whereas Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that investment restrictions could reduce the value of
external equity claims by limiting managers’ ability to shift value from creditors to equity-holders.
Identifying the independent effect of a capital expenditure restriction is a difficult task since credit
agreements likely create additional news that might affect share prices. Nonetheless, preliminary
evidence on share price effects of credit agreement announcements suggests that equity-holders benefit
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from capital expenditure restrictions. More specifically, using the same sample employed in this paper,
we find that cumulative abnormal returns from one month before to one month after the announcement of
a credit agreement are 2 to 3% higher when the agreement contains a capital expenditure restriction. A
more rigorous analysis of this result is material for future research, but the unconditional correlation
suggests that equity-holders benefit from creditor-imposed investment restrictions.
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Table 1
Comparison of Deals Matched and Not Matched to a Credit Agreement
This table compares loan deals in LPC’s Dealscan that we are able to match to a credit agreement from the
SEC’s Edgar database of company filings to those that we are unable to match. Tests for the difference in
means allow for errors to be correlated for the same borrower.
(1)
Not matched to a contract

(2)
Matched to a contract

Number of deals

5,860

3,720

Dealscan data quality
Secured data not available {0,1}
Financial covenant data not available {0,1}
Percentage held by lenders not available {0,1}
Dividend restriction data not available {0,1}

0.439
0.421
0.718
0.523

0.162*
0.069*
0.567*
0.074*

Type of loan
Sole-lender loan {0,1}
Revolver with maturity of < 1 year {0,1}

0.308
0.234

0.181*
0.096*

Borrower characteristics
Total assets ($M)
Book debt/total assets
Cash flow/total assets

2,005
0.295
0.030

1,622*
0.301
0.034

407
177

450
170

Loan characteristics
Loan amount ($M)
Interest rate spread (basis points)

*Statistically distinct from “not matched” category at 1% level

Table 2
Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 3,720 credit agreements to 1,931 borrowers.
Mean

Median

St. Dev.

N

Capital expenditure restrictions
Capital expenditure restrictiont {0,1}
Restriction, stated as capital expenditurest /assetst-1
Capital expenditurest /assetst-1

0.319
0.090
0.064

0.000
0.057
0.037

0.466
0.143
0.087

3,720
483
483

Other loan characteristics
Agreement amountt ($M)
Agreement amountt / assetst
Intrerest rate spreadt (basis points above LIBOR)
Agreement is secured {0,1}
Agreement contains dividend restriction {0,1}
Agreement contains a line of credit/revolver {0,1}

450
0.338
170
0.647
0.813
0.938

200
0.245
150
1.000
1.000
1.000

985
0.308
119
0.478
0.390
0.241

3,720
3,720
3,720
3,117
3,446
3,720

Borrower characteristics
Cash flowt-1 / assetst-1
Financial covenant violation within past yeart-1
Total assets t-1 ($M)
Market to book ratio t-1
Book leverage ratiot-1
Firm has a corporate credit rating t-1 {0,1}

0.034
0.063
1,622
1.768
0.301
0.490

0.034
0.000
674
1.426
0.288
0.000

0.026
0.242
1,974
1.136
0.193
0.500

3,720
3,720
3,720
3,720
3,720
3,720

Conditional on borrower having credit rating
Credit rating (1 = AAA or AA, 2 = A, 3 = BBB …)
Junk rated {0,1}
AAA, AA rated {0,1}
A rated {0,1}
BBB rated {0,1}
BB rated {0,1}
B rated {0,1}
CCC rated or worse {0,1}

3.502
0.482
0.016
0.160
0.341
0.289
0.172
0.020

3.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

1.066
0.500
0.127
0.367
0.474
0.454
0.378
0.141

1,822
1,822
1,822
1,822
1,822
1,822
1,822
1,822

Not necessarily

Bad for shareholders

Control rights contingent in original
contract?

The effect of creditor control on expost gains to outside shareholders?

After negative performance,
or when firms near
bankruptcy kink point.

No

Managerial – shareholder conflict?

Hypotheses
When does control over investment
policy shift to creditors?

Ex-post risk shifting at
expense of creditors;
managers pursue risky
investment

Managers, external
shareholders, creditors

Jensen & Meckling (1976)

Managerial agency problem?

Setting
Players?

No role for outside
shareholders

Not necessarily

After signal implies that
“bad” state is realized,
where bad state (loosely)
signifies low monetary
returns and high managerial
private benefit

No role for outside
shareholders

Ex-post private benefit leads
to inefficient investment
decisions. Loosely, “excess
continuation bias” in low
monetary return states

Managers, creditors

Aghion & Bolton (1992)

Good for shareholders

Yes. For ex-ante incentive
purposes, manager must
understand punishment
mechanism in original
contract

After negative performance,
as it is evidence that manager
shirked

Yes. Shirking by
management hurts outside
shareholders as well as
creditors

Ex-ante private benefit from
shirking

Managers, external
shareholders, creditors

Dewatripont & Tirole (1994)

Table 3
Theoretical Setting and Hypotheses Compared to Our Empirical Setting

Financial covenant
violations represent
parallel to contingent
contracts.

Three measures of
performance: (1) low
profitability, (2) financial
covenant violation, (3)
credit downgrades

Managers, external
shareholders, creditors on
private bank loan
agreements.

Our Empirical Setting

Table 4
Capital Expenditure Restrictions, Across Types of Firms
This table presents the fraction of credit agreements that have a capital expenditure restriction by industry,
size, and credit rating.
Fraction with capital
expenditure
restriction
Totals
Fraction of credit agreements with restriction
0.319
Fraction of firms that ever have credit agreement with restriction
0.424
Estimated fraction of all Compustat firms with restriction, using Sufi (2006)
0.336
Fraction of credit agreements with restriction:
By industry
Agriculture, minerals, construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, communication, and utilities
Trade—wholesale
Trade—retail
Services

0.154
0.324
0.230
0.360
0.433
0.399

By size (book assets)
Less than $100M
$100M to $250M
$250M to $500M
$500M to $1,000M
$1,000M to $2,500M
$2,500M to $5,000M
Greater than $5,000M

0.468
0.469
0.443
0.381
0.243
0.133
0.086

Borrower does not have credit rating
Borrower has credit rating

0.392
0.242

Conditional on firm having rating
Investment grade
Junk rated {0,1}
AAA, AA rated {0,1}
A rated {0,1}
BBB rated {0,1}
BB rated {0,1}
B rated {0,1}
CCC rated or worse {0,1}

0.060
0.437
0.000
0.031
0.077
0.393
0.490
0.622

-2.267**
(0.737)

0.140**
(0.059)
-1.998**
(0.738)

-0.053
-0.052
(0.034)
(0.034)
-0.013
-0.012
Market to book ratio t-1
(0.016)
(0.015)
Book leverage ratiot-1
0.100
0.071
(0.111)
(0.111)
Number of credit agreements
2,742
2,742
Number of firms
961
961
R2
0.19
0.19
*,** statistically distinct from 0 at the 5 and 1 percent, respectively

Ln(total assets t-1 ($M))

Cash flowt-1 / assetst-1

Financial covenant violationt-1

CCC rated or worse t-1 {0,1}

B rated t-1 {0,1}

BB rated t-1 {0,1}

BBB rated t-1 {0,1}

Dependent variable

0.013
(0.054)
-0.029
(0.024)
-0.129
(0.152)
1,453
475
0.22

0.134
(0.079)
-1.761
(1.160)

0.050
(0.037)
0.234**
(0.076)
0.266*
(0.118)
0.562**
(0.183)

Borrower fixed effects regressions
(1)
(2)
(3)
CapEx
CapEx
CapEx
Restriction {0,1}
Restriction {0,1}
Restriction {0,1}

-0.064**
(0.005)
-0.021**
(0.008)
0.187**
(0.049)
3,720
1,939
0.18

-1.141**
(0.367)

(4)
CapEx
Restriction {0,1}

-0.062**
(0.005)
-0.020**
(0.008)
0.178**
(0.049)
3,720
1,939
0.18

0.134**
(0.037)
-0.979**
(0.365)

Pooled regressions
(5)
CapEx
Restriction {0,1}

-0.043**
(0.011)
-0.015
(0.013)
0.053
(0.074)
1,822
844
0.29

0.082
(0.067)
-1.853**
(0.677)

-0.018
(0.020)
0.176**
(0.035)
0.216**
(0.047)
0.283**
(0.099)

(6)
CapEx
Restriction {0,1}

This table presents estimated coefficients from linear probability regressions that relate the probability of having a capital expenditure restriction in a credit
agreement to borrower performance in the 4 quarters preceding the loan origination. Columns 1 through 3 present borrower fixed effects regression estimates
using only borrowers with at least 2 credit agreements and columns 4 through 6 present pooled regression estimates using the full sample. The sample for
columns 3 and 6 includes rated firms only, and the omitted group is borrowers rated A or better. All regressions include year indicator variables, loan purpose
indicator variables, and loan type indicator variables. Standard errors are clustered for each borrower.

Table 5
Negative Firm Performance and Capital Expenditure Restrictions

0.26
0.42
0.41

Dividend restriction {0,1}

Secured {0,1}

Interest rate spread

Capital expenditure restriction {0,1}

0.33

0.38

Dividend restriction{0,1}

0.59

Secured {0,1}

This table presents unconditional correlations between the probability of a loan containing a capital expenditure restriction and other loan contract terms. All
correlations are statistically distinct from 0 at the 1 percent level.

Table 6
Correlations between Capital Expenditure Restrictions and Other Loan Contract Terms

0.072
(0.060)
-5.691**
(0.896)

(1)
Ln(Interest rate
spread)

0.049
(0.099)
-5.478**
(1.492)

0.345**
(0.086)
0.688**
(0.117)
0.855**
(0.154)
0.895**
(0.162)

(2)
Ln(Interest rate
spread)

-0.188**
-0.094
(0.037)
(0.058)
Market to book ratio t-1
-0.063**
-0.099**
(0.023)
(0.036)
Book leverage ratiot-1
0.718**
0.655**
(0.116)
(0.145)
Number of credit agreements
2,742
1,453
Number of firms
961
475
R2
0.53
0.74
*,** statistically distinct from 0 at the 5 and 1 percent, respectively

Ln(total assets t-1 ($M))

Cash flowt-1 / assetst-1

Financial covenant violationt-1

CCC rated or worse t-1 {0,1}

B rated t-1 {0,1}

BB rated t-1 {0,1}

BBB rated t-1 {0,1}

Dependent variable

-0.116**
(0.027)
-0.019
(0.024)
0.251**
(0.097)
2,272
942
0.34

0.039
(0.053)
-1.395*
(0.694)

(3)
Secured {0,1}

-0.100*
(0.042)
-0.067*
(0.034)
0.260*
(0.115)
1,194
466
0.56

-0.001
(0.068)
-1.537
(1.174)

0.043
(0.063)
0.321**
(0.101)
0.304**
(0.117)
0.319*
(0.150)

(4)
Secured {0,1}

-0.070**
(0.027)
-0.012
(0.022)
0.002
(0.091)
2,559
957
0.15

0.062
(0.049)
-0.691
(0.606)

(5)
Dividend
restriction {0,1}

-0.106*
(0.046)
-0.025
(0.035)
-0.024
(0.127)
1,386
475
0.22

0.180*
(0.084)
-0.922
(1.054)

0.026
(0.084)
0.186
(0.099)
0.132
(0.109)
0.146
(0.126)

(6)
Dividend
restriction {0,1}

This table presents estimated coefficients from borrower fixed effects linear probability regressions that relate loan contract terms to borrower performance in the
4 quarters preceding the loan origination. The sample for columns 1, 3, and 5 includes borrowers with at least 2 credit agreements in the sample. The sample for
columns 2, 4, and 6, includes rated borrowers with at least 2 credit agreements in the sample, and the omitted rating group is the set of borrowers that are rated A
or better. All regressions include year indicator variables, loan purpose indicator variables, and loan type indicator variables. Standard errors are clustered for
each borrower.

Table 7
Negative Firm Performance and Other Loan Contract Terms

0.607*

Renegotiated agreement that follows
financial covenant violation

Number of credit agreements
112
Number of firms
51
*,** statistically distinct from 0 at the 5 and 1 percent, respectively

0.372

(1)
CapEx
Restriction {0,1}

Original agreement

Contract term

112
51

250**

188

(2)
Interest spread
(basis points)

97
49

0.923

0.800

(3)
Secured {0,1}

103
51

0.947

0.848

(4)
Dividend restriction
{0,1}

This table presents mean differences in loan contract terms for contingent contract pairs. A contingent contract pair contains two credit agreements between the
same borrower and the same bank where the origination date of the later contract is earlier than the maturity date of the earlier contract, and the later contract is
preceded by a financial covenant violation. The later contract represents a renegotiated contract, where the renegotiation is caused by a financial covenant
violation. Tests for differences in the means cluster standard errors for each borrower.

Table 8
Contingent Contract Analysis

-0.001
(0.002)
-0.011+,#
(0.005)

(2)
Average 2 years after –
average 2 years before
-0.004+
(0.002)
-0.010+,#
(0.004)

PANEL B

-0.004+

-0.001
(0.002)
-0.008+,#
(0.004)

(3)
Year after – year before

(4)
Average 2 years after –
average 2 years before
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.005#
(0.004)

-0.016+

0.072
0.056
0.047

-0.014+

0.080
0.065
0.055

Year after contract

Average 2 years after –
Average 2 years before
-0.007+

0.083
0.072
0.072

Year of contract

Year after – year before

0.089
0.094
0.082

1 year before
contract

Difference in cash flowt / assetst-1

0.073+
0.103+
(0.022)
(0.024)
Difference Qt-1
0.023+
0.024+
(0.002)
(0.002)
N
2,671
2,671
2,671
2,671
R2
0.02
0.04
0.14
0.21
+statistically distinct from 0 at the 10 percent level; # statistically significant from omitted group (no capital expenditure restriction) at 10 percent level

Capital expenditure restriction {0,1}*
Previous loan does not have restriction{0,1}

Capital expenditure restriction {0,1}

Dependent variable:

(1)
Year after – year before

contains restriction - does not contain restriction
contains restriction & previous loan does not contain restriction
- does not contain restriction

Difference in difference

Loan:
does not contain restriction
contains restriction
contains restriction & previous loan does not contain restriction

PANEL A
2 years before
contract

This table examines the capital expenditure patterns of firms before and after signing a loan contract, conditional on whether the loan contract contains a capital
expenditure restriction. Panel A presents the unconditional means, and it presents tests for differences in the differences in capital expenditures for firms that
have or do not have a capital expenditures restriction in their loan agreement. Panel B reports regressions relating the difference in capital expenditures to an
indicator variable of whether the loan contract contains a restriction and changes in control variables. The regressions in Panel B contain year indicator variables.

Table 9
Capital Expenditures Before and After a Capital Expenditure Restriction

Change in contract term, as % of mean

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

Capital expenditure restriction

Secured

Dividend restriction

Financial covenant violation in past year

Interest rate spread

Drop in cash flow from 90th to 10th percentile

This figure presents the marginal effect of negative performance on loan contract terms for a given borrower. It presents the marginal effect on contract terms for
a drop in cash flow from the 90th percentile of the distribution to 10th percentile of the distribution (left) and the marginal effect of a financial covenant violation
(right). The marginal effect is stated as the percent change relative to the mean. For example, a financial covenant violation in the past year results in a 44%
increase in the incidence of a capital expenditure restriction at the mean, and a 15% increase in the interest rate spread at the mean. The estimated marginal
effects come from fixed effects regressions reported in Tables 5 and 7.

Figure 1: How Does a Negative Performance Shock Affect Loan Contract Terms?
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This figure presents the marginal effect of credit downgrades from A or above on loan contract terms for a given borrower. The marginal effect is stated as the
percent change relative to the mean. For example, a firm that is downgraded from A to B expreriences a 60% increase in the likelihood of having a capital
expenditure restriction at the mean. The estimated marginal effects come from fixed effects regressions reported in Tables 5 and 7.

Figure 2: Changes in Loan Contract Terms in Response to Credit Downgrades
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Figure 3: Capital Expenditures - Capital Expenditure Limit

-9%

-8%

-7%

-5%

-4%

-3%

-2%

-1%

0%

1%

(Capital Expenditures - Capital Expenditure Limit) / Lagged Assets

-6%

2%

3%

4%

5%

This figure presents a histogram of the difference between actual capital expenditures and the capital expenditure limit, expressed as a ratio to lagged assets. Actual capital
expenditures are for the first fiscal year after the loan contract is signed. Values below -10% and above 5% are excluded, and the sample includes the remaining 457 loans
for which we have the actual capital expenditure restriction. The solid black line is a normal distribution with identical mean and variance.
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This figure presents a histogram of the difference between actual capital expenditures and the capital expenditure limit, where actual capital expenditures are for the first
fiscal year after the loan contract is signed (solid black) and for the fiscal year immediately preceding the year in which the contract is signed (striped). Differences are
scaled by lagged assets. The sample includes only the 81 loans where the prior sample loan did not include a capital expenditure restriction.

Figure 4: Capital Expenditures - Contractual Limit, Year Before and Year of Loan

